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BOOTSTRAPS AND CAPITAL GAIN-A
PARTICIPANT'S VIEW OF
COMMISSIONER v. CLAY BROWN
William H. Kinsey*
I.

BACKGROUND OF

Commissioner v. Clay Brown1

held corporation may be sold in a variety of ways. At
one end of the spectrum is an all-cash sale. In such a transaction, the seller receives the purchase price and has no further concern with the economic well-being of the business. The difficulty
with this method, of course, is finding a purchaser with sufficient
cash who is willing to pay a fair price.
At the other end of the spectrum is a full-fledged bootstrap sale,
where there is no down payment other than from the underlying
assets of the sold corporation, and the purchaser's obligation to pay
the purchase price over a period of years is dependent upon income
generated by the underlying corporate assets and upon the assets
themselves. Because of this dependency, a bootstrap seller remains
vitally interested in the economic well-being of the corporation until
the purchase price is fully paid.
Benveen these nvo extremes are sales where some down payment
is made from independent sources, and the purchaser assumes personal liability for all or a portion of the purchase price. The significance of the· purchaser's assumption of personal liability naturally
depends upon his financial affluence.

A

CLOSELY

A. Impact of Capital Gain Treatment
A motivating factor in any sale of a closely held corporation is
the ability of the seller to report his profit as long-term capital gain.
Few closely held corporations would be sold for an all-cash purchase
price if the gains from such sales were taxable as ordinary income.
Similarly, few bootstrap transactions would be undertaken if the resulting gains were taxable as ordinary income. Denying capital-gain
treatment to either type of sale may have the practical effect of
banning such sales.
The purchase price in a bootstrap sale may be greater than the
purchase price in an all-cash sale. However, it is no more accurate
• Member of the :Bars of Oregon, New York, and Michigan. Mr. Kinsey briefed
and argued the Clay Brown case before the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Ci;rcuit, and the United States Supreme Coux:t.-Ed.
I. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
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to assume that the purchase price in a bootstrap sale is unreasonably
high than it is to assume that the purchase price in an all-cash sale
is unreasonably low. Neither the possibility of an excessive purchase
price nor the possibility of other abuse is sufficient reason to ban
bootstrap sales through judicial determination that they fail to comply with the "sale" prerequisite for capital-gain treatment. This was
the broad holding of the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Clay
Brown. An understanding of the case may be facilitated by a review
of the nature and mechanics of bootstrap sales along the lines presented to the Supreme Court in the taxpayers' brief.

B. Typical Bootstrap Situation
In a typical bootstrap situation, S owns all the stock of corporation X, which S believes to be worth a specified sum. P, perhaps a
key employee, desires to purchase corporation X, but he may not
have sufficient cash to pay the price demanded by S. Nevertheless, S
may be willing to entertain a purchase offer from P under an arrangement whereby P will pay the agreed price over a reasonable
period of time with funds generated by the X assets.
I£ P purchases the X stock and pays the purchase price from aftertax income of X distributed to P as dividends, each dollar of income
generated by the X assets will be subject to the corporate tax and
also to the tax on P's personal income. Assuming a 52 per cent corporate tax rate,2 48 cents would remain out of each generated dollar
after payment of the corporate tax. If the dividends subject P to a
70 per cent individual tax rate, the 48 cents less the 70 per cent individual tax would leave a net 14.4 cents out of each dollar generated by the X assets for payment by P upon the purcp.ase price.
Obviously, P must devise a better proposition if he is to interest S
in selling corporation X under an arrangement where the purchase
price will be paid out of income generated by the X assets.

I. Standard Plan for Bootstrap Sales
Elimination of the necessity for dividend extraction in the foregoing purchase plan would subject each generated dollar to only the
corporate tax, thus leaving 48 cents for payment upon the purchase
price. A more or less standard plan accomplishes this objective. P
forms new corporation Y with nominal capital, and Y (not P) pur2. Although the present corporate tax rate on net income in excess of $25,000 is
48%, a 52% rate is assumed in this article because that rate was in effect during the
years involved in the Clay Brown case.
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chases the X corporation stock from S for a price payable over a
period of years. 8 Forthwith, corporation X is liquidated into Y,
with corporation Y taking over all of the assets and liabilities of X. 4
Upon receipt of the X assets, corporation Y grants a mortgage
thereon to S, securing Y's obligation to pay the purchase price. The
stock of corporation Y may be deposited in escrow as additional collateral security. Corporation Y pays the purchase price out of income
generated from its ownership and operation of the former X assets.
The income generated by corporation Y's operation of the former X
assets is not taxed as a dividend to P (or anyone else) when paid
upon the purchase price. No dividend distributions are required,
since the purchase-price obligor and the owner and operator of the
assets are the same entity.
While the standard plan assures a minimum of 48 cents out of
each dollar generated by the underlying corporate assets for payment
upon the purchase price, it is not easy to pay for a business with
48-cent dollars. The objective is to obtain something in excess of
the 48-cent minimum, and this may be possible as a result of the
additional cash flow available to purchasing corporation Y, which
was not available to acquired corporation X. Cash flow is net taxable income plus depreciation and other deductions not requiring a
cash outlay. For example, if a corporation has $100,000 of income
and $50,000 of depreciation, the corporation has $50,000 of net taxable income ($100,000 less $50,000 depreciation) subject to a tax of
$26,000 (52 per cent of $50,000), leaving $74,000 available for payment upon the purchase price. Assuming that the foregoing reflects
the amount of depreciation available to Y corporation after the con3. Since the purchase price is payable over a period of years, S desires to report the
purchase price on the installment basis. This accounts for S's selling the stock rather
than having X corporation sell assets to new corporation Y. If X corporation sold
assets, it would be necessary to comply with § 337 of the Internal Revenue Code to
preclude recognition of gain upon the sale. Qualification under § 337 requires complete liquidation of corporation X within twelve months, and distribution of corporation P's obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price would result in immediate capital gain tax to X based on the present value of the deferred payments.
All of this is avoided, and S is entitled to elect the installment method under
§ 453(b)(l)(B), when he sells stock and does not receive more than 30% of the purchase
price during the year of sale.
4. No gain is recognized to X corporation on the distribution of its assets to Y
corporation as liquidating distributions. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 336. However,
depreciation recapture may be required by § 1245 or § 1250. See Part VII infra. Y
corporation obtains an immediate cost basis for the X corporation stock equal to the
full purchase price. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1012. No gain is recognized to Y
corporation upon receipt of the X assets as liquidating distributions. Recognition of
gain is expressly precluded by § 332, but Y corporation would not have any gain
upon the liquidation even in the absence of § 332, since Y corporation has a cost basis
for the X corporation stock equal to the full purchase price.
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summation of the transaction, the effect would be to leave 74 cents
of each generated dollar for payment on the price of the X stock.
Obtaining an increased cash flow for purchasing corporation Y
does not require exploitation of a tax loophole. One of the fundamental principles of our tax system is that every purchaser obtains
a tax _basis for acquired property equal to the purchase price, and
he is entitled to recoup this basis in some way and at some time
without payment of any tax. Under section 334(b)(2) of the Internal
Revenue Code, the purchaser--corporation Y-obtains a basis for
the former X assets equal to the purchase price which Y agrees to pay
for the X stock, plus the liabilities of X assumed upon the liquidation of X into Y. 5
The number of after-tax cents per dollar generated by the underlying assets will exceed the 48-cent minimum to the extent that
_corporation Y is able to correlate payments upon the purchase price
with recoupment of the cost basis. A perfect correlation would result
in 100 cents after taxes out of each dollar generated by the former X
assets. Since depreciation is a primary method of basis recoupment,
if all the assets acquired by corporation Y consisted of depreciable
property, and if payment of the purchase price coincided exactly
·with the economic life of that depreciable property, there would
be perfect correlation producing 100-cent dollars. The acme of
100-cent dollars is seldom, if ever, attained in a bootstrap sale, because not all the assets are depreciable, and because the seller desires
payment as quickly as possible. It is possible, however, to approach
the acme and substantially exceed the 48-cent minimum. 6

2. Tax Exempt Purchasers
Tax exempt institutions have a competitive advantage ~n the
bootstrap field if income generated by the underlying assets can be
realized in a manner which avoids the tax imposed upon unrelated
business income.7 Rental from a lease for not more than five years is
excluded from unrelated business income; 8 consequently, such
5. Treas. Reg. § l.334-l(c)(4)(viii) (1955).
6. See Part IV infra for an example of sales where the acme of 100-cent dollars is
achieved as a matter of course.
7. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 511.
8. Section 512(b)(3)•(4) of the Code excludes from unrelated business income all
rental except that from business leases as defined in § 514. Section 514(b) defines a
business lease as a lease for a term of more than five years if there is a business lease
indebtedness with respect to the property. In a bootstrap purchase, there would be
a business lease indebtedness, so the applicability of § 514 may be avoided by limiting
the lease term to not more than five years.
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leases are commonly used by tax exempt institutions in bootstrap
transactions. Utilization of the rental exemption, however, requires
modification of the standard bootstrap plan. Rather than operating
the acquired assets, as in the case of the ordinary purchasing corporation, the tax exempt purchaser leases the assets to an operating
company under a lease for not more than five years. The bootstrap
attributes are retained, since no down payment is made except from
the acquired assets, and liability for the purchase price is limited to
the rental received.
To present an attractive bootstrap proposal, a tax exempt institution must receive at least 75 per cent of the income generated by
the underlying corporate assets, particularly if the institution retains
a portion of the income during th~ pay-out period. A formula which
has been developed by certain institutions requires rental payments
equal to 80 per cent of the operating company's net income. The
institution retains IO per cent of the rental and pays the remaining
90 per cent to the sellers for application upon the purchase price.
This particular formula, which was employed in the Clay Brown
transaction, produces 72 cents out of each dollar generated by the
underlying corporate assets for payment upon the purchase price.
The 72 cents is 90 per cent of the 80 cents received as rental by the
tax exempt institution from each dollar realized by the operating
company.
While the institute applies its tax exemption to the rental received under the five-year lease, it does not follow that all of the
rental paid by the operating company to the tax exempt purchaser
would incur a corporate tax if the institution were a tax paying
entity. Every purchaser, irrespective of any tax exemption, receives
a basis for the acquired assets equal to the purchase price. As reviewed above, tax-free recoupment of basis may produce after-tax
results which substantially exceed the 48-cent minimum and approach the 100-cent ideal.
Since the purchase price in a bootstrap sale is dependent upon
income generated by the underlying corporate assets, a prudent
seller, as part of his security, insists upon managerial control until
the purchase price has been paid. Such an arrangement is particularly necessary when the purchaser is not prepared to supply competent management. Ordinarily, a tax exempt purchaser does not
provide management, so the operating company is managed by the
person or persons who formerly managed the acquired corporation.9
9. In the Clay Brown case, the Tax Court clas.5ified the management contract be-
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If the Clay Brown transaction had been handled under the standard bootstrap plan utilizing a business corporation rather than a
tax exempt entity as purchaser, each dollar generated by the Clay
Brovm & Company assets would have left the following amounts
per dollar after taxes available for payment upon the purchase price:
70 cents the first year, 67 cents the second year, 64 cents the third
year, 62 cents the fourth year, and 60 cents the fifth year-an average of 65 cents for the five-year period. 1 Comparison of the 72-cent
dollars produced by the Clay Brown transaction utilizing a tax exempt institution with the 65-cent dollars which could have been
generated with the same assets under the standard bootstrap plan
gives the transaction a complexion different from the pallor cast by
a comparison of the Clay Brown results with the 14.4-cent dollars
which would have been available to an individual purchaser. 11 Nevertheless, the Commissioner used hypothetical transactions producing
14.4-cent dollars as the norm for his comparisons. As the taxpayers
asserted before the Supreme Court in Clay Brown, no one can be
expected to buy a business with 14.4-cen't dollars.

°

tween the seller, Clay Brown, and the operating company as a part of the security
instruments. See Clay B. Brown, 37 T.C. 461, 483 (1961).
10. Computation of these percentages is set forth in the table below, which is based
upon the following realistic assumptions: $1,000,000 of the purchase price for the
Clay Brown & Company stock is allocated to depreciable property. In all probability,
the sum of $1,170,000 could have been allocated to depreciable property and timber,
so the $1,000,000 assumption is conservative. REv. Proc. 62-2, 1962·2 CuM. BuLL. 418,
setting forth guidelines for depreciation, specifies a useful life of ten years for a saw•
mill and its equipment, the assets involved in Clay Brown. There is no salvage value
required under these guidelines, since the period specified takes salvage value into
account. That is, a ten-year useful life is the same as a nine-year useful life with 10%
salvage. The declining-balance method of depreciation (l½ times) is used. Annual
earnings of $350,000 before depreciation and taxes are also assumed.
1st year

2d year

3d year

4th year

5th year

$350,000
150,000

$350,000
127,500

$350,000
108,375

$350,000
92,120

$350,000
78,305

200,000
104,000

222,500
115,700

241,625
125,645

134,100

141,280

96,000

106,800

115,980

123,780

130,415

127,500

108,375

92,120

78,305

64.1

61.7

59.6

l. Earnings before

depreciation
2. Depreciation
3. Taxable income
4._ Tax=52%
5. Net Income
6. Add back
depreciation
7. Cash flow
Cents of cash flow
per dollar generated
(ratio between
line 7 and line 1)

150,000

271,695

--$224,355
$215,900
$208,720
- - --- - - - ---

$246,000

$234,300

70.3

67.0

---

--257,880

11. See text accompanying note 2 supra.
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THE COMMISSIONER'S ATIACK

In Revenue Ruling 54-420,12 the Commissioner launched a threepronged attack against bootstrap sales involving tax exempt institutions. One thrust of the attack denied capital-gain treatment to the
sellers. Considerable litigation ensued, and the controversy eventually reached the Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Clay Brown.
The particular facts of the case are concisely related in the Court's
opinion.18
The Commissioner based his denial of capital-gain treatment
solely upon the bootstrap attributes of the transaction. Whether the
purchaser is a business corporation generating income from direct
operation of the acquired assets, or whether the purchasing corporation is a tax exempt institution deriving income from a lease of the
assets to an operating company, the bootstrap attributes are the same
-payment of the purchase price is dependent upon income generated by the underlying assets and upon the assets themselves. Consequently, the Commissioner's attack in Clay Brown was not confined to sales involving tax exempt institutions, but rather was aimed
at all bootstrap sales. In fact, the Commissioner's attack applied not
12. 1954-2 CUM. BULL, 128.
13. "The basic facts are undisputed. Clay Brown, members of his family and three
other persons owned substantially all of the stock in Clay Brown and Company . • • •
Clay Brown, the president of the company and spokesman for the group, was approached by a representative of California Institute for Cancer Research in 1952, and
after considerable negotiation the stockholders agreed to sell their stock to the Institute
for $1,300,000, payable $5,000 down from the assets of the company and the balance
within 10 years from the earnings of the company's assets. It was provided that simultaneously with the transfer of the stock, the Institute would liquidate the company
and lease its assets for five years to a new corporation, Fortuna Sawmills, Inc., formed
and wholly owned by the attorneys for the sellers. Fortuna would pay to the Institute
80% of its operating profit without allowance for depreciation or taxes, and 90% of
such payments would be paid over by the Institute to the selling stockholders to apply
on the $1,300,000 note. This note was noninterest bearing, the Institute had no obligation to pay it except from the rental income and it was secured by mortgages and
assignments of the assets transferred or leased to Fortuna. If the payments on the note
failed to total $250,000 over any two consecutive years, the sellers could declare the
entire balance of the note due and payable. The sellers were neither stockholders nor
directors of Fortuna but it was provided that Clay Brown was to have a management
contract with Fortuna at an annual salary and the right to name any successor manager if he himself resigned.
"The transaction was closed on February 4, 1953. Fortuna immediately took over
operations of the business under its lease, on the same premises and with practically
the same personnel which had been employed by Clay Brown and Company. Effective
October 31, 1954, Clay Brown resigned as general manager of Fortuna and waived his
right to name his successor. In 1957, because of a rapidly declining lumber market,
Fortuna suffered severe reverses and its operations were terminated. Respondent sellers
did not repossess the properties under their mortgages but agreed they should be sold
by the Institute with the latter retaining 10% of the proceeds. Accordingly, the property was sold by the Institute for $300,000. The payments on the note from rentals
and from the sale of the properties total~d $936,131.85." 380 U.S. at 566.
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only to bootstrap sales of closely held corporations, but also to all
other transfers for deferred payments contingent on future income.
In a six-to-three decision, the Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's contention that bootstrap attributes preclude compliance
with the "sale" prerequisite for capital-gain treatment.

A. Economic Substance of Bootstrap Sales
No attempt was made by the taxpayers in Clay Brown to rely
upon mere formulistic compliance with the "sale" prerequisite for
capital-gain treatment. Similarly, the taxpayers did not minimize
the bootstrap attributes of the transaction. They fully recognized
th~t payment of the purchase price was completely dependent upon
income generated by the underlying corporate assets and upon the
assets themselves. No down payment was made from independent
sources, and the Institute's liability to pay the purchase price was
limited to income generated by the business. For economic substance, the taxpayers relied upon the substantial change of economic
benefits which occurred despite the bootstrap attributes.
After a seller of stock in a bootstrap transaction executes the
stock purchase agreement, each dollar paid to him from income generated by the underlying corporate assets is applied to the purchase
price. When the sum of the payments equals the purchase price, all
interest of the seller terminates, and the purchaser becomes the sole
mmer of the business. While payment of the purchase price in a
bootstrap sale usually requires a number of years, a change in economic benefits occurs upon execution of the purchase agreement.
Thereafter the seller has no alternative but to relinquish all rights
when the purchase price has been paid. Each payment upon the purchase price made from income increases the equity of the purchaser
and hastens the complete termination of the seller's interest. Only
in the event of default will the seller recapture the property.
A bootstrap seller could well insist that all cash flow not needed
in the business be devoted to payment of the purchase price. However, a less stringent requirement is imposed under transactions of
the Clay Brown type. The tax exempt purchas-er is entitled to retain ten per cent of the rental received from the operating company.
In bootstrap sales not involving tax exempt institutions, the purchaser may also be allowed to use a small portion of cash flow for
something other than payments upon the purchase price or capital
improvements. Such interim enjoyment of a portion of the income
permitted the purchaser during the pay-out period represents some
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change in economic benefits, but the change which affords real economic substance is the potential termination of the seller's interest
upon full payment of the purchase price and the emergence of the
purchaser with free and clear title.
In the Clay Brown case, an effort was made by the Commissioner
in the Tax Court to negate the change in economic benefit which
resulted from the ability of the Institute to acquire the business free
and clear upon payment of the purchase price. ·He contended that
the Institute was never intended to be the ultimate owner of the
business, since a tacit understanding existed between the parties
which permitted the taxpayers to collapse the transaction and recapture the assets through an artificial triggering of a default. Substantiation of such a tacit understanding would have drained the transaction of economic substance.
To refute the Commissioner's contention that such a tacit understanding had been made by the parties, the taxpayers pointed to the
extensive price negotiations and to the testimony of the Institute's
president that the primary motivation of the Institute was the prospect of obtaining the assets free and clear after the purchase price
had been fully paid, in order to convert th~ property into money for
use in cancer research. If the Institute had never been intended to
end up with a clear title to the assets, the extensive price negotia~
tions were mere window dressing, and the president of the Institute
was less than candid in his testimony concerning the primary motivation of the parties. In rejecting the Commissioner's contention,
the Tax Court found that the price was the result of bona fide negotiations in an arm's-length transaction devoid of any plan or arrangement for artificially triggering a· default.14 The Tax Court further found that basic to the entire transaction was the taxpayer's
obligation to relinquish all interest in the underlying corporate
assets upon payment of the purchase price. In the opinion of the
Tax Court, this change of interest constituted a real change of economic benefits.15
14. "Upon consideration of all the evidence in this case we hold that the transaction constituted a bona fide sale by petitioners to the institute arrived at in arm'slength negotiations and devoid of any tacit understanding of the parties to collapse
the deal at a time deemed appropriate by petitioners or of any plan or arrangement
for artificially triggering a default." 37 T.C. at 486.
15. "Petitioners by the transaction here involved parted with their equitable ownership of the assets when they transferred the stock to the Institute.••• This change of
interest constitutes a change of economic benefits thus distinguishing this case from
the cases relied on by respondent. In the present case the stock was transferred outright to the Institute and such transfer was basic to the entire transaction.•••" Id. at
484.
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Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the
Commissioner abandoned his contention that there had been a tacit
understanding between the parties, but he nevertheless asserted that
the control exercised over the operation of the business by Clay
Brown through his management contract permitted the taxpayers,
as a practical matter, to cause a default and recapture the assets.
However, the taxpayers pointed out that a purposefully induced
default would violate the spirit, if not the letter, of the agreement
and that tax consequences are not determined by rights which a
party may exercise through breach of agreements. 16
In the presentation before the Supreme Court, the Commissioner
made no assertions militating against the fact that all the interest of
the selling taxpayers would terminate upon full payment of the purchase price, and Mr. Justice White emphasized this point in the majority opinion.17 Similarly, Mr. Justice Harlan, in his concurring
opinion, stated that the taxpayers relinquished important rights as
a result of the transaction and received something substantially different in return.18
B. Risk-Shifting
Ignoring any change in economic benefits resulting from the taxpayers' obligation to relinquish all interest upon payment of the
purchase price, the Commissioner based his argument before the
Supreme Court upon the lack of any risk-shifting after the execution
of the purchase agreement. Since payment of the purchase price was
dependent upon income generated by the underlying corporate
assets, the taxpayers retained the risk of economic adversity. Having
invested nothing and having assumed no personal liability, the Institute could lose nothing if the business were unable to pay the
purchase price.
The taxpayers acknowledged their vital stake in the economic
16. See 325 F.2d 313 (9th Cir. 1963).
17. See 380 U.S. at 569.
18. Id. at 580. In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Goldberg stated: "Brown retained
full control over the operation of the business; the risk of loss and the opportunity
to profit from gain during the normal operation of the business shifted but slightly.
If the operation lost money, Brown stood to lose; if it gained money, Brown stood
to gain, for he would be paid off faster." Id. at 587. It is not clear why Mr. Justice
Goldberg believed that "the opportunity to profit from gain during the normal operation of the business shifted but slightly," particularly since he stated that there
would be a faster payoff if the operation gained money. The faster the payoff, the
faster all rights of Brown would terminate, and the Institute would emerge with the
property free and clear. This is something more than a slight shift of economic benefit.
Perhaps the phrase "during the normal operation of the business" is meant to presume
a purchase price which will require normal operations before payment is effectuated,
If so, the statement is understandable, but the presumption concerning the purchase
price finds no support in the Clay Brown facts.
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welfare of the business until the purchas~ price was paid, but contended that, with respect to capital-gain treatment, tbe significance
of risk-shifting is no greater than the consequences which may evolve
from the lack of shift. In this regard, the only consequence which
can result from the risk retained by a seller in a bootstrap sale is
that he will receive something less than the agreed purchase price.
As was asked by the taxpayers in their brief, why should the mere
possibility that a seller might receive less than the agreed purchase
price preclude capital-gain treatment for amounts actually received?19 In what may become a classic statement in the area of
capital-gains taxation, Mr. Justice White exposed the fallacy in the
0
Commissioner's risk-shifting contention:
To say that there is no sale because there is no risk-shifting
and that there is no risk-shifting because the price to be paid
is payable only from the income produced by the business sold,
is very little different from saying that because business earnings are usually taxable as ordinary income, they are subject to
the same tax when paid over as the purchase price of property.
This argument has rationality but it places an unwarranted construction on the term "sale," is contrary to the policy of the
capital gains provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, and has
no support in the cases. We reject it.20
The Commissioner's argument concerning risk-shifting was also
interspersed with frequent use of the term "transfer with income
reserved." It was never made clear exactly what substantive support
this term gave the risk-shifting argument, or how the lack of riskshifting converted what would otherwise be a sale into a "transfer
with income reserved." Neither the majority nor the concurring
or dissenting opinions took cognizance of the term.
C. Impact of the Purchase Price Upon Economic Substance

Since the purchaser in a bootstrap transaction bears no ·risk of
economic loss, he might content himself with the fringe benefits
19. As was further pointed out by the taxpayers in their brief, where persons
purposefully transfer property for less than the acknowledged value at the time of
the transfer, the existence of a sale has never been questioned. In such situations, the
problem is one of how the transferee should account for the bargain portion of his
"bargain purchase." If the purchaser is an employee, the bargain portion is compensation. Treas. Reg. § l.61-2(d)(2) (1957). If the purchaser is a family member, the
bargain portion is a gift. Treas. Reg. § 1.101-l(e) (1957).
20. 380 U.S. at 570. This statement is buttressed by the following quotation from
Mr. Justice White's opinion: "To require a sale for tax purposes to be to a financially
responsible buyer who undertakes to pay the purchase price from sources other than
earnings of the assets sold or to make a substantial down payment seems to us at
odds with commercial practice and common understanding of what constitutes a sale.''
Id. at 575.
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accruing during the pay-out period (such as the ten per cent of the
rental which the Institute was permitted to keep) and let the seller
name his own purchase price. An unreasonably large purchase price
could nullify the economic substance attributable to the termination of all the seller's interest upon full payment. Indeed, if the
purchase price is so high that default and recapture of the assets are
foregone conclusions at the time of transfer, there is no economic
substance, and the transaction is a sham in the mold of J(olkey v.
Commissioner. 21 Similarly, if it is reasonably certain at the time of
transfer that the assets will be exhausted by the burden of paying
the purchas~ price, the seller will have relinqui.shed little or nothing
by virtue of the agreement that the purchaser will end up with the
assets free and clear upon payment of the price. Again, the transaction would lack economic substance.22 In oral argument before the
Supreme Court, the taxpayers acknowledged the potential abuses in
bootstrap sales, and that such potential justifies scrutiny of the transaction by the trial court. However, the mere possibility of abuse furnishes no ground for an appellate court to disallow capital-gain treatment when the trial court has approved the bona fide nature of the
transaction.
During the Tax Court hearing in Clay Brown, the Commissioner
did not question the reasonableness of the purchase price. Although
the Tax Court found that the price was the result of real negotiations arrived at in an arm's-length transaction and that the Institute
was motivated by the primary objective of ending up with the assets
free and clear,23 such findings were not attributable to any challenge of the purchas~ price by the Commissioner. Rather, as previously related, such findings were made by the Tax Court in substantiation of the taxpayers' response to the Commissioner's assertion
that, because of a tacit understanding which permitted the taxpayers
21. 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
22. See Part V infra for a discussion of the proposition that capital gain is not
precluded by the transferor's ownership of stock in the transferee corporation. The
right of the transferor to own stock in the transferee may confer as much control over
the business as the ability to recapture the assets upon an inevitable foreclosure or
to exhaust the assets in the process of paying the purchase price. Consequently, such
economic substance may not be absolutely essential to capital-gain recognition, although it is most helpful.
23. The following quotations from the Tax Court's opinion arc pertinent:
"The primary motivation of the institute ••• was the prospect of ending up with
the assets free and clear after the purchase price had been fully paid, which
would then permit the institute to convert the property into money for use in
cancer research." 37 T.C. at 471.
"The price ••• was the result of real negotiating." Id. at 486.
"The finally agreed price was arrived at in an arms-length transaction ••••" Id.
at 488.

February 1966]

Bootstraps and Capital Gain

593

to recapture the assets through an artificial triggering of a default,
the Institute was never intended to end up with the assets.
Perhaps all that is required by way of purchase price substantiation is a finding that the price resulted from real arm's-length negotiations with a properly motivated purchaser. However, the Tax
Court went a step further in Clay Brown and found that the purchase price was within a reasonable range in light of the earnings
history of the corporation and the adjusted net worth of the corpo-rate assets. 24 This finding was volunteered .by the Tax Court, possibly in response to the taxpayers' basic theme that there are no
grounds for denying compliance with the sale prerequisite for capital-gain treatment if the purchase price is reasonable and the interest retained by the sellers for. security purposes does not extend
beyond the point of full payment of the purchase price.
In the Supreme Court, the Commissioner combined his riskshifting argument with assertions concerning the absence of a realistic purchase price. According to the Commissioner, any bargaining
in a bootstrap transaction is economically meaningless because of
the lack of risk-shifting, and an excessive purchase price is inevitable. While Mr. Justice White recognized that there was some theoretical logic to this argument, he noted that it conflicted with the
express finding of the Tax Court, supported by evidence in the record, that the purchase price was within reasonable limits based on
the earnings and net worth of the company.25 In addition, Mr. Justice White observed that if an excessive price is such an inevitable
result of the lack of risk-shifting, it should be possible for the Commissioner to demonstrate that fact instead of failing to offer any
evidence whatsoever on the ·point.26

III.

REAsoNABLE APPROACH- TO PURCHASE PRICE

A. Judicial Suggestion for Modified Approach
No tax abuses can arise from a bootstrap sale if the purchase price
of the business is within a reasonable range of the value of the stock
at the time of transfer, and if all interest of the seller terminates
upon payment of the purchase price. The bootstrap attributes of
such a transaction can only reduce the amount of capital-gain bene24. "The price of $1,300,000 (including the $125,000 of notes) was the result of real
negotiating. It was within a reasonable range in the light of the earnings history
of the corporation and the adjusted net worth of the corporate assets." Id. at 486.
25. 380 U.S. at 573.
26. Ibid.
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fits by causing the seller to receive less than the reasonable value of
the property. Assuming that all interest of the seller terminates upon
payment of the purchase price, the primary problem in bootstrap
. sales, if one exists, is to police the amount of the purchase price.
However, policing the purchase price should take a form other than
denial of compliance with the "sale" prerequisite for capital-gain
treatment, since this approach results in the taxation of all the gain
as ordinary income, not merely the excessive portion.
The Supreme Court's opinion in Clay Brown extended to the
Commissioner an invitation to modify his position. Mr. Justice
White suggested that there are more precise approaches to the question of possibly excessive purchase prices, and further observed
that the Commissioner's attack was a clear case of overkill.27 Mr.
Justice Harlan referred to the Commissioner's contention as an "all
or nothing theory."2 8
The harshness of the Commissioner's "all or nothing" attack
on bootstrap sales was particularly apparent in the Clay Brown case.
Clay Brown & Company at the time of sale had a book net worth
of $619,457, of which $448,471 constituted accumulated earnings
upon which the corporate tax had been paid. With appraised values
substituted for book figures, the reconstructed net worth of the
company was $1,064,877. Moreover, a capitalization-of-earnings approach supports a value substantially in excess of $1,300,000, which
was the agreed purchase price.29 Even if the purchase price in Clay
Brown had been $2,000,000, and $700,000 thereof were deemed
excessive, why should all the gain be taxed as ordinary income, when
a substantial portion of the assets represented accumulated earnings
upon which the corporate tax had been paid? This, in turn, raises
the question of what criteria should be used for determining the
reasonable range of a purchase price and what tax consequences
should result if the price exceeds the reasonable range but falls
short of being so excessive as to nullify economic substance.

B. Determination of a Reasonable Price Range
Revenue Ruling 59-60,30 supplemented by a vast body of case
law, sets forth the approach, method, and factors to be considered
in valuing, for estate and gift tax purposes, shares of stock in closely
held corporations-the property most often sold in bootstrap trans27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 579.
Id. at 581.
See note 32 infra,
1959-1 CUM. BULL, 237.
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actions. If the purchase price iii a bootstrap sale is no greater than
the value that would be assigned under the criteria of Revenue Ruling 59-60, the price should be within a reasonable range.31
Under Revenue Ruling 59-60, primary consideration is accorded
to earnings in the valuation of the stock of a closely held corporation such as Clay Brown & Company. It is clear from an analysis
of the cases involving such a valuation through capitalization of
earnings that the earnings record of Clay Brown & Company would
have justified a price substantially in excess of the $1,300,000
actually set by the parties to the transaction.32 The facility with
which the criteria of Revenue Ruling 59-60 support the Clay Brown
purchase price may account for the Commissioner's failure to raise
the issue of reasonableness in the Tax Court.33
C. Treatment of Excessive Portion
What should be the tax consequence if the valuation criteria
in Revenue Ruling 59-60, or other appropriate criteria, establish
that a portion of the purchase price in a bootstrap sale is excessive?
The answer is suggested by the manner in which the Commissioner
treats sales between related parties, particularly sales between a
31. In Rev. Rul. 65-192, I.R.B. 1965-31, 10, the Commissioner announced that the
general approach and methods of Rev. Rul. 59-60 are applicable to valuations of stock
for income and other tax purposes as well as for estate and gift tax purposes. The
"intrinsic value" determined by application of the approach and methods of Rev.
Rul. 59-60 must not be confused with "fair market value" as the ter-m is used in
§§ lO0l(b) or 30l(b)(l)(A)-the price at which prope11ty would change hands between
a willing buyer and seller under no compulsion to buy or sell and having reasonable
knowledge of relevant facts. As illustrated by Andrew B. C. Dohrmann, 19 B.T.A. 507
(1930), and Champlin v. Commissioner, 7 F.2d 23 (10th Cir. 1934), stock may have substantial intrinsic value but no "fair market value" because there is no market where
the holder can sell it for anything approaching its intrinsic value. John H. Altorfer,
T.C. Mem. 1961-48, held that the "willing seller" concept causes property to lack a
fair market value when no one will pay what the seller considers a fair price.
If the owner of a closely held corporation could make a cash sale at the value determined through the general approach of Rev. Rul. 59-60, he would not consider a bootstrap sale. The primary motivation of bootstrap sales is the inability to find a purchaser
willing to pay cash equal to the value determined by the methods of Rev. Rul. 59-60.
32. Clay Brown &: Company had annual earnings of $339,000 prior to the sale. The
earnings rate used in valuing stock under the capitalization-of-earnings approach
generally varies from 6% to 10%, See Florence M. Harrison, 17 T.C.M. 776 (1958).
An earnings rate of 6% indicates a value of $5,650,000 for the Clay Brown &: Company stock, and an earnings rate of 10% gives a value of $3,390,000. With an earnings
rate of 15%, a high rate the Commissioner seldom if ever uses, the value of the
Clay Brown &: Company stock would be approximately $2,200,000.
33. It is doubtful that the purchase price in any transaction employing the
mechanics of the Clay Brown sale would be excessive, since the five-year limitation
upon leases which the charity could make and still receive the rental tax free means
that the earnings of the corporation must be sufficient to permit payment of the
purchase price within the five-year period. A purchase price which can be paid out
in five years from earnings will ordinarily support a substantially higher value under
the criteria of Revenue Ruling 59-60.
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principal stockholder and his corporation, where hard bargaining
is not expected. There is at least as much chance of an excessive
purchase price in such transactions as in the case of bootstrap sales.
However, if the price is excessive in a sale between a principal
stockholder and his corporation, the Commissioner taxes only the
excessive portion as ordinary income, permitting capital-gain treatment for the remainder.
Taxing only the excessive portion as ordinary income fits the
penalty to the al~eged rule infraction. An example of fitting the
penalty to the infraction is found in Roy G. Champayne.84 This is
one of the cases cited in Revenue Ruling 58-353,80 which confirms
capital-gain treatment under the general capital-gain provisions for
transfers of all rights in a patent. The patent transfer in the Champayne case was between a majority stockholder and his corporation.
Because of the relationship between the parties, the .court gave the
transaction special scrutiny, which resulted in a determination that
a portion of the consideration was excessive. However, only the
excessive portion was taxed as ordinary income, and capital gain
treatment was accorded the remainder. A similar approach was
taken by the Tax Court in the recent case of Arthur M. Rosenthal,86
involving the sale of buildings to a corporation controlled by the
seller. The court held that there was a valid sale to the extent of·
the fair market value of the properties, but that the excessive portion of the consideration should be treated as disguised dividends
to the extent of the corporation's earnings and profits.
The presence of bootstrap attributes may call for the same scrutiny as do sales between majority stockholders and their corporations. The dividend rationale of the Rosenthal case is used by the
Commissioner to tax as ordinary income the excessive portion of
the purchase price in sales between such related parties. While the
dividend rationale is not available in a bootstrap sale, there should
be another, similar rationale to justify this modified approach.
Capital-gain benefits apply to proceeds from the sale of capital assets, and amounts in excess of the value of such assets at the time
of transfer represent something other than the proceeds from the
sale of capital assets.
The lack of a rationale for taxing only the excessive portion of
the purchase price as ordinary income did not account for the Commissioner's disinclination to pursue this modified approach in Clay
34. 26 T.C. 634 (1956).
35. Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CVM. BULL. 408.
36. P-H 1965 TAX Cr. REP. &: MEM. DEC. 1J 65254 (Oct. 1, 1965).
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Brown. During Tax Court. preparations, the taxpayers in Glay
Brown offered to stipulate that any portion of the purchase price
found by the court to be excessive should be taxed as ordinary income, if the Commissioner would stipulate that the reasonable portion was entitled to capital-gain treatment. The Commissioner
declined this proposal.
The Commissioner has announcea in 'l;IR-76887 that the Glay
Brown decision does not extend to cases where the amount payable
to the seller exceeds the fair market value of the stock at the time
of transfer. In such cases the Commissioner ·will continue to resist
what he considers an attempt to convert future business profit
into capital gain. It is not clear whether the Commissioner will treat
only the excessive portion of the purchase price as future business
profits, or whether he will revert to his "all or nothing" approach.
IV.

THE COMMISSIONER'S ATTACK EXTENDED BEYOND

BOOTSTRAP SALES

The purchase price in a bootstrap sale is a fixed amount. In
a different type of sale, the amount of the purchase price is measured
by future income generated by the transferee's use of the property.
When the amount of the purchase price is measured by future income, payment of the purchase price is necessarily dependent thereon. The following is a typical transaction in this contingent-price
category: S, owner of a patent which he purchased from the inventor,
grants all rights in the patent to Pin consideration of P's agreement
to pay S a specified percentage of the net profit or gross receipts
realized by P from his exploitation of the patent during its full remaining life. The arrangement permits S to terminate the rights of
P upon failure of P to pay specified minimum amounts.
A long line of authorities sustains capital-gain treatment for
amounts received by S in the above illustration.88 Such transactions
are classic examples of transfers for a consideration dependent upon
future income. Since dependency upon future income was the basis
of the Commissioner's argument for denying capital-gain treatment
37. TIR-768, Oct. 1, 1965.
38. See cases cited in Rev. Rul. 58-353, 1958-2 CuM. BuLL. 408. Section 1235
applies to the sale or exchange of patents by the inventor or any other individual
who has acquired his interest in the patent for consideration paid to the inventor
prior to actual use of the patent. Thus, the transaction depicted in the above illustration is beyond the scope of § 1235, because S was not the inventor and did not
obtain his interest through consideration paid to the inventor prior to the actual
reduction to practice. As indicated by the cases cited in Rev. Rul. 58-353, supra,
§ 1235 is not deemed exclusive, and failure to come within § 1235 does not preclude
capital-gain recognition under the general. capital-gain provisions.
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in Clay Brown, he could not ignore these common patent-transfer
arrangements. However, his problem was compounded by Revenue
Ruling 58-353,39 in which he had expressly confirmed capital-gain
treatment for such transfers.
Unable to reconcile the contingent-price patent transfers with
his assertion in Clay Brown that there is no compliance with the
"sale" prerequisite for capital-gain treatment when payment of the
purchase price is dependent upon future income generated by
the transferred property, the Commissioner boldly asserted that all
the cases according capital-gain treatment to patent transfers were incorrect and that the courts which had rendered those decisions had
been unduly preoccupied with legalistic property concepts. The
only reference to Revenue Ruling 58-353 was in a footnote of the
Commissioner's brief, where it was claimed that the ruling was
issued merely to stem an increasing tide of adverse court decisions
"at least for the time being."
The shift of economic benefits is not the same in a contingentprice patent transfer as in a bootstrap sale. In patent transfers, the
seller and the purchaser share proportionately in the income generated by the patent over its full useful life. There is not the possibility of disproportionate benefits that there is in the case of bootstrap sales, where all, or substantially all, of the income goes to the
seller until the purchase price has been paid, and thereafter all of
the income, as well as the property itself, belongs to the purchaser
free from any further claims of the seller.40 As noted by Mr. Justice
White, even if the Commissioner were correct in his contention that
the decisions which allow capital-gain treatment for contingentprice patent transfers were erroneous, it would not follow that
capital-gain recognition should likewise be denied in bootstrap
sales.41
Not only do the contingent-price patent transfers covered by
39. 1958-2 CUM, Buu.. 408.
40. In a contingent-price transfer, the measure of value is a percentage of future
income, while in a bootstrap transaction the measure of value is a fixed price. In a
fixed-price bootstrap transaction, all, or substantially all, of the income generated by
the transferred assets is devoted to payment of the purchase price. In a contingentprice transfer, the percentage of income devoted to payment of the purchase price
is usually a minor fraction, although there may be transactions where there is busi•
ness purpose and economic substance if the purchaser agrees to pay the seller all
profits and income realized by the purchaser from the acquired property. Contingent
prices measure value where it is difficult to fix value in terms of a flat amount. For
example, a patentable invention must embody a "flash of genius." How can one
measure the value of such a device prior to ascertaining its commercial feasibility?
Similarly, there are situations other than patent sales where contingent prices are used,
See, e.g., Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931); Cassatt v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 74!i
(3d Cir. 1943); Estate of Raymond T. Marshall, 20 T.C. 979 (1953).
41. See 380 U.S. at 577 n.8.

February 1966]

Bootstraps and Capital Gain

599

Revenue Ruling 58-353 represent classic examples of consideration
dependent upon future income from the property transferred; such
transfers are also classic examples of an exact correlation between
the recoupment of tax basis and payments upon the purchase price.
& previously mentioned, the acme of 100-cent dollars is seldom
obtained in bootstrap sales. However, this result is achieved as a
matter of course in contingent-price sales of patents, since the exact
amounts paid to the transferor are deductible as depreciation by
the transferee. The right of the patent transferee to deduct the payments in full as depreciation is confirmed by the Commissioner's
published acquiescence in Associated Patentees, Inc. 42 Since the
overall tax benefits sought in bootstrap sales are less than the tax
benefits routinely attained in contingent-price patent transfers, the
Commissioner undoubtedly would have changed Revenue Ruling
58-353 if the Supreme Court had substantiated his contentions in
Clay Brown.

v.

EFFECT OF SELLER'S OWNERSHIP OF STOCK IN PURCHASER

In a standard bootstrap transaction, one or more of the selling
stockholders may own, or desire to own, stock of the purchasing
corporation. A pertinent inquiry is whether such an arrangement
will jeopardize capital-gain treatment.
& a general proposition, capital-gain benefits are not precluded
by the transferor's ownership of stock in the transferee corporation,
since a corporation is a taxable entity separate from the stockholders.
If it were not for the express provisions of section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code, a person would realize gain when he receives
stock or other securities from his wholly owned corporation ·in
exchange for property which has appreciated in value. The character of the gain-capital or non-capital-is unaffected by the transferor's control of the transferee corporation, unless a contrary conclusion is dictated by express Code provisions, such as section 1239.
Under section 1239, ordinary-income treatment is required for gain
realized upon the sale of depreciable property between an individual and a corporation in which the individual owns more than
eighty per cent of the stock. This amounts to statutory recognition
that capital-gain treatment is allowed upon the sale of depreciable
property by an individual to a corporation in which he owns up to
eighty per cent of the stock. In situations where the property is
not depreciable, capital-gain treatment is allowed even though the
seller owns all of the stock of the purchasing corporation.
42. 4 T.C. 979 (1945), acq., 1959-2

CUM.

Buu.. !I.
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A person who owns eighty per cent of the stock of the purchasing corporation not only retains an indirect beneficial interest in
the transferred property, but also h:as the ability to acquire a direct
interest through the simple expediency of liquidating the corporation. Furthermore, an individual who owns eighty per cent (or
even fifty-one per cent) of the stock of the purchasing corporation
may exercise greater control over the corporation's operations than
is possible through a management contract such as that between
Clay Brown and the operating company.48
Although capital-gain treatment is not precluded by the transferor's stock ownership in the transferee corporation unless an applicable Code provision dictates otherwise, the Commissioner is
quick to find statutory provisions which he believes alter the general proposition. A bootstrap sale under the standard plan involves
the transfer of property between two corporations and the payment from earnings of the purchasing corporation to the former
stockholders of the corporation which has been sold. Nothing more
is needed for the Commissioner to assert the existence of a reorganization as defined in section 368 of the Internal Revenue Code. His
purpose in· :finding such a reorganization is to invoke section
356(a)(2), which, if applicable, permits taxation of the purchase-price
payments as dividends.44
y\There the selling stockholders own eighty per cent or more of
the stock of the purchasing corporation, the Commissioner might
43. In his Supreme Court presentation, the Commissioner did not stress the control
exercisable by Clay Brown over the operating company as a ground for denying
capital-gain treatment. Nevertheless, control over assets generating payment of the
purchase price is a cornerstone of Mr. Justice Goldberg's dissent. Limitation of the
purchaser's liability to income generated by the acquired property (and the property
itself) would not cause negation of a sale, under the dissenting view. Statements made
by Mr. Justice Goldberg during oral argument indicated that he was aware that 100%
financing occurred in the business world. It is only when such limitation of liability
is combined with control over the operation that the dissenting Justices would deny
capital-gain treatment. In addition to emphasizing the control feature, the dissent
expressed considerable doubt concerning the propriety of tax exempt institutions
participating in bootstrap transactions. If the transaction involved in Clay Brown
had been a standard bootstrap sale where the purchaser, a business corporation,
supplied the management, there would have been no dissent, even though payment
of the purchase price were limited to income generated by the transferred business
and the assets thereof. The only question is how the dissent would regard: (1) a
standard bootstrap transaction not involving a tax exempt charity where the seller
controls management during the payout period, or (2) a· bootstrap sale utilizing a
tax exempt charity where the seller divorces himself from all control over the
operation.
44. See Moore, Taxation of Distributions Made in Connection With a Corporate
Reorganization, 17 TAX L. R.Ev. 129 (1961); Nicholson, Recent Developments in the
Reincorporation Area, 19 TAX L. R.Ev. 123 (1964). As discussed in note 45 infra, it is
doubtful that § 356(a)(2) applies to payments made from profits earned after the
purchase.
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assert the existence of a section 368(a)(l)(D) reorganization, using the
rationale employed in the liquidation-reincorporation area. 45 I£ the
selling stockholders do not own eighty per cent of the stock of the
purchasing corporation, there is no possibility of a clause D reorganization. However, the Commissioner may nevertheless claim a
clause E or F reorganization, as he has do!le under the liquidationreincorporation doctrine even when the stockholders of the transferor corporation ·own less than fifty per cent of the stock of the
transferee corporation.46 When the stock ownership of the selling
45. A bootstrap transaction under the standard plan has never been involved in a
case where the Commissioner has asserted a reorganization. However, the Commissioner
has successfully asserted a clause (D) reorganization in situations involving § 337. Cases
in this and related fields are discussed in the articles cited in note 44 supra. Cases
decided since the publication of these two articles where the Commissioner has established the existence of a dividend based on a clause (D) reorganization are: South
Texas Rice Warehouse Co., 43 T.C. 540 (1965); James Armour, Inc., 43 T.C. 295 (1964);
Harry Trotz, 43 T.C. 127 (1964); Reef Corp., P-H 1965 TAX CT. REP. & MEM. DEC.
11 65072 (April 9, 1965).
In the cases involving § 337, the distributions taxed as dividends were those made
upon liquidation of the acquired corporation. In these § 337 transactions; the acquiring
corporation purchases the assets of the acquired corporation, which is liquidated with
its remaining assets (including the purchase price received upon the sale to the
purchaser) being distributed to the stockholders upon such liquidation. If the purchase
price is payable on a deferred-payment basis, the deferred-payment obligation is
distributed to the stockholders of; the acquired corporation upon its liquidation,
1
together with the other assets.
In a bootstrap transaction under the standard plan, the liquidating distributions
are received by the acquiring corporation, not the stockholders of the acquired corporation. A portion of the cash received by the acquiring corporation upon the liquidation
of the acquired corporation may be paid as an initial installment upon the purchase
price for the stock of the acquired corporation. Even· if a bootstrap sale under the
standard plan is deemed to be a reorganization, can the initial payment made by the
purchasing corporation from assets received upon liquidation of the acquired corporation be taxed as a dividend under § 356(a)(2)? In most bootstrap sales, this problem
would not be particularly acute since the initial payment is usually small, practically
all of the purchase price being paid from cash flow generated by the purchasing
corporation's operation of the underlying assets.
The more important problem is whether there is any basis for taxing as a dividend
subsequent purchase price payments made by the purchasing corporation from income
generated by its operation of the underlying assets. Can payments from profits earned
by the acquiring corporation after the stock transfer and after liquidation of the
acquired corporation into the acquiring corporation be considered. as cash "boot"
within the coverage of § 356(a)(2), such coverage being necessary before the Commissioner can sustain a dividend assertion? Existence of a reorganization does not
assure the applicability of § 356(a)(2), although the provision cannot apply unless
there is a reorganization. There are effective arguments which can be made in opposition to the applicability of § 356(a)(2) if the Commissioner should rely upon it in a
bootstrap sale under the standard plan. However, rather than relying upon the nonapplicability of § 356(a)(2) if there is a reorganization, it is better to avoid coverage
of the reorganization provisions. A clause D reorganization is avoided if stockholders of
the sold corporation own less than 80% of the stock of the purchasing corporation.
The assertion of a clause D reorganization has been the Commissioner's main weapon
in the liquidation-reorganization area.
46. See Rev. Rul. 61-156, 1961-2 CUM, BULL. 62. However, the Commissioner has
met with little success in urging a clause E or F reorganization where former stockholders of "the acquired corporation own less than 80% of the stock of the acquiring
corporation. The Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's contentions in Hyman H.
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stockholders in the purchasing corporation exceeds, or even approaches, fifty per cent, such ownership should be justified by sound
business reasons other than the desire to obtain capital-gain
benefits. 47
VI.

COMPARISON WITH STOCK REDEMPTIONS

In a bootstrap sale of a closely held corporation, the transferor
may have a right to the underlying corporate assets and the cash
flow from them to enforce payment of the purchase price. If a transferor is entitled to only the corporate surplus to enforce payment,
the label "bootstrap" may be overly strong. Perhaps the term "shoestring" is appropriate to denote a transaction in which the transferor has less claim upon the underlying corporate assets than the
transferor in a bootstrap transaction.
A typical stock redemption would represent a "shoestring" transaction. In such a case, corporation X redeems all the stock of majority stockholder S for a fixed redemption price payable over a
period of years. Under the corporation laws of most states, stock
can be redeemed only out of surplus.48 Mr. Justice Harlan's terse
observation in the first sentence of his concurring opinion in Clay
Brown applies with equal force to such a stock redemption: "Were
it not for the tax laws, the . . . transaction . . . would make no
sense."49 In a tax-free society, S could receive his share of the
earnings and surplus indefinitely without limitation, and there
would be no reason for him to give up his stock interest when payments from earnings and surplus aggregate a specified sum.
How strong is the bargaining position of corporation X when
it negotiates the redemption price for the stock of controlling stockholder S? Could a court find that the redemption price results from
real negotiations in an arm's-length transaction, as did the Tax
Court in Clay Brown? It seems just as accurate to say that an excessive purchase price is inevitable in a stock redemption as in the
case of a bootstrap sale. However, allowance of capital-gain treatBerghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965); Book Production Indus., Inc., P-H 1965 TA.X CT, REP.&:
MEM. DEC. ,I 65065 (April 2, 1965). In Pridemark, Inc., 42 T.C. 510 (1964), the Tax
Court sustained the Commissioner's assertion of a clause F reorganization, but its decision was reversed on appeal. See Pridemark, Inc. v. Commissioner, 345 F.2d 35 (4th Cir,
1965).
47. A strong business purpose was emphasized by the Tax Court when it rejected
the Commissioner's asserted reorganization in Joseph C. Gallagher, 39 T.C. 144 (1962).
In that case the stockholders owned 38% of the stock of the acquired corporation and
73% of the stock of the acquiring corporation. Business purpose was also emphasized in
Hyman H. Berghash, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), where the sole stockholder of the acquired
corporation owned 50% of the stock of the acquiring corporation.
48. For a discussion of the problems in this area, see Herwitz, Installment Repurchase of Stock: Surplus Limitations, 79 HARv. L. R.Ev. 303 (1965).
49. 380 U.S. at 579.
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ment for stock redemptions is imbedded in the tax law through
section 302 of the Code and related cases. There has been no suggestion that capital-gain benefits are jeopardized by dependency of
the redemption price upon the underlying corporate assets. Yet,
such dependency is inherent in stock redemptions.50
There is a good reason why a stockholder will permit redemption
of his stock from corporate assets without demanding an excessive
price. Redemption proceeds are entitled to capital-gain treatment,
while most other corporate withdrawals are taxed as ordinary income. The rationality of such transactions was perceived by Mr.
Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion in the Clay Brown case.
After relating that the transaction would make no sense if it
were not for the tax laws, Mr. Justice Harlan observed that the tax
laws exist as an economic reality in the businessman's world, much
like the existence of a competitor, and businessmen plan their
affairs around both. The fact that a transaction is tax-motivated does
not mean it lacks economic substance. The economic substance of
a stock redemption is the elimination or substantial reduction of
the stockholder's interest in the corporation. Such is the thesis of
section 302.
From the standpoint of risk-shifting, a bootstrap seller retains
less risk than a stockholder who has his stock redeemed for a redemption price payable over a period of years. A redemption does
not increase the cash flow of the redeeming corporation, even
though the redemption price substantially exceeds book value. The
redeeming corporation obtains no step-up in basis for the corporate
assets to which the stockholder must look for payment of the redemption price. In a bootstrap sale, the purchasing corporation
receives a tax basis for the corporate assets commensurate with the
purchase price, thereby increasing the cash flow emanating from
the assets to which the selJer must look for payment of the purchase
price.

VII.

IMPACT OF DEPRECIATION RECAPTURE UNDER SECTIONS
AND

1245

1250

One benefit which a bootstrap purchaser can offer a prospective
seller is the increased cash flow available to the purchasing corporation. The primary source of such increased cash flow is the step-up
in basis for the depreciable assets under section 334(b)(2) of the
Code, which permits the purchasing corporation to allocate among
50. The redeemed stockholder may continue as an officer, director, or employee
of the redeeming corporation if he has no relationship to the other stockholders
under the attribution rules of § 318(a).
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the acquired assets the purchase price of the stock and the liabilities
assumed. Prior to the enactment of sections 1245 and 1250, the
step-up in basis could be accomplished without any corresponding
gain or other tax detriment to the acquired corporation upon its
liquidation into the purchasing corporation.
Section· 1245 applies to personal property such as machinery and
equipment, and section 1250 applies to buildings.61 Under section
1245, the full step-up in basis of the machinery and equipment is
taxed as ordinary income to the extent of depreciation taken after
December 31, 1961. Section 1250 applies to depreciation taken after
December 31, 1963, and the depreciation recapture varies with the
length of time that the building has been owned, starting with full
recapture during the first year and ending with no recapture after
the tenth year.
The event in a bootstrap transaction which triggers the applicability of section 1245 or section 1250 is the distribution of the property by the acquired corporation to the purchasing corporation
upon the liquidation of the acquired corporation into the purchasing corporation. Applicability of section 1245 or section 1250 is
not precluded if the purchaser is a tax exempt institution. The
depreciation recapture is incurred by the distributing corporation,
and a tax exempt institution would inherit the liability as transferee to the same extent as a non-tax exempt purchaser.
While sections 1245 and 1250 are applicable to bootstrap sales
only to the same extent as to other sales, the impact of these provisions upon bootstrap transactions is particularly severe, since the
tax costs of the depreciation recapture may, to a considerable extent,
counteract the additional depreciation available to the purchasing
corporation. As pointed out to the Supreme Court in Clay Brown,
bootstrap sales may be relics of a bygone era due to the effect of
section 1245. Therefore, substantiation of the Commissioner's position was not required to deal with an acute currently existing
problem.
Sections 1245 and 1250 do not apply to tax-free transactions
such as transfers of assets in connection with reorganizations as
defined in section 368, or to liquidations of subsidiaries under section 332 if section 334(b)(2) is not applicable. The advantages of
avoiding the impact of sections 1245 and 1250 may outweigh the
benefits of obtaining a step-up in basis, thereby changing the ground
rules for corporate sales. Previously, purchasers of corporations attempted to avoid the reorganization provisions of the Code because
51. See generally Branda, Problems in Recapture of Depreciation,
N.Y.U. 23d ANNUAL INsr. oN FED. TAX. 449 (1965).
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of the dividend problems discussed earlier. Moreover, the reorganization provisions provide for a carryover basis for the assets rather
than a step-up in basis requisite to increased depreciation and cash
flow. Currently, means may be sought to accomplish corporate buyouts under the provisions for tax free reorganizations even where
the purchase price is payable over a period of years. 52 Perhaps the
next tax frontier in the corporate buy-out field will be the development of a plan which will permit a bootstrap transaction without
causing depreciation recapture under section 1245 or section 1250.53
\

VIII.

DEDUCTIBILITY OF RENT BY OPERATING COMPANY

In another thrust of the three-pronged attack upon bootstrap
sales involving tax exempt institutions, the Commissioner challenged the ability of the operating companies to deduct the rent
payments for income tax purposes. This issue was not involved in
the Clay Brown case, but the function of the operating company is
such an integral part of such transactions that the favorable opinion
of the Supreme Court in Clay Brown should have some impact upon
the Commissioner's claims regarding the deductibility of the rent as
a business expense by the operating companies.
Decisions of the Tax Court on the issue of rentals have varied.
In Anderson Dairy, Inc., 54 the first decision on the question, the
Tax Court sustained the right of the operating company to deduct
the full amount of the rental paid to the tax exempt lessor. The
decision was based on the fact that the lessor and the operating
company were unrelated parties, and the Internal Revenue Code
does not limit deductions for rental payments to a "reasonable
52. However, one obstacle is the "continuity of interest" requirement. If the
stockholders of the acquired corporation received only debt obligations of the acquiring corporation, the necessary continuity of interest would be lacking. Even if there
were a reorganization, the receipt of debt obligations for stock would result in
the taxation of these securities as "boot" under § 356. Perhaps preferred stock could
be used in the place of debt obligations. While the requisite continuity of interest
must be represented by stock, it need not be voting stock. See 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION § 20.59, at 223 (1942); Darrell, The Use of Reorganization Techniques in Corporate Acquisitions, 70 HARv. L. REv. 1183 (1957).
53. The impact of §§ 1245 and 1250 may result in greater use of stock redemptions
for accomplishing corporate buy-outs along the lines utilized in Zenz v. Quinlivan,
213 F.2d 914 (6th Cir. 1954) (approved by the Commissioner in Rev. Rul. 55-745,
1955-2 CUM. BULL. 223). In Zenz, a sole stockholder of a corporation sold part of her
stock to a purchaser, ~d shortly thereafter bad the remainder of her stock redeemed
by the corporation for an amount equal to the corporation's earned surplus. It may
be possible to adapt this approach to bootstrap acquisitions by having the purchaser
acquire a small portion of the stock from the selling stockholder and then have the
corporation redeem all the remaining stock of the selling stockholder for a redemption
price payable over a period of years from the earnings of the corporation. However,
in bootstrap sales, one must also consider the impact of the interest imputation provisions of § 483.
54. 39 T.C. 1027 (1963).
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allowance" as in the case of salary or other compensation. Similar
conclusions were reached in Isis Windows, Inc. 55 and Oscar C.
Stahl. 56
In Royal Farms Dairy Co. 57 and Estate of Sol Goldenberg, 58 the
Tax Court reduced the deductible rental from eighty per cent of
net income as provided under the leases to fifty per cent and fiftyfive per cent respectively. The grounds for these decisions were findings that, although the rental amounts were part of the standard
formula used by tax exempt institutions in such transactions, the
purpose of these two rental arrangements was to give the lessors
funds with which to pay the purchase price of the stock. According
to the Tax Court, this, together with lack of substantial negotiations
between the lessor and the operating company, militated against
the argument that the rental was required as a condition to the
operating company's use of the leased property.
When the full background of rental formulas is understood,
standardization of the rental provision supports rather than refutes
the conclusion that the operating company had no alternative but
to accept the formula if it desired to participate in the transaction.
The tax exempt purchaser must obtain approximately eighty per
cent of the income generated by the underlying corporate assets if
it is to enjoy a competitive advantage over bootstrap propositions,
which could be offered under the standard plan not involving tax
· exempt institutions.59 Why should the operating company engage
in futile negotiations for a lower percentage, particularly if the
eighty per cent figure is also attractive from the lessee's viewpoint?
An opportunity to obtain the use of all the assets of a going business for an obligation to pay eighty per cent of the generated income
is most appealing to a prospective lessee. The lack of liability for
rental if no income is realized warrants a limitation of the lessee's
share of profits to twenty per cent. Is there any better example of
a fair rental rate than one which not only satisfies the lessor's requirements for obtaining funds with which to pay the purchase price for
the leased assets, but is also attractive to the lessee?
55. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. ,r 63176 (1963).
56. 32 P-H Tax Ct. Mero. 1f 63201 (1963).
57. 40 T.C. 172 (1963).
58. P-H 1964 TAX Cr. REP. & MEM. DEC, 1f 64134 (1964),
59. Rental of 60% of net income would leave only 54 cents out of each generated
dollar for payment upon the purchase price if the tax exempt purchaser retained
10% of the rental. Fifty-four cents is only slightly higher than the 48-cent minimum
obtainable under the standard bootstrap plan. Rental of 70% of net income would
leave 63 cents out of each generated dollar for payment upon the purchase price,
As previously discussed in note 9 supra and accompanying te.xt, handling of the
Clay Brown transaction under the standard plan would have produced an average of
65 cents over the 5-year period.
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Operating companies in transactions of the Clay Brown type
must accept the eighty per cent rental formula if they desire to
participate. The only question is whether the required payment of
eighty per cent of net income is rental, or payments in a joint undertaking to supply the lessor with the required funds. 60 Regardless of
how the payments are labeled, the operating company should not
be taxed with income which the company was required to relinquish as a condition to participation in the transaction.

IX.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

On the basis of only a casual observation, transactions of the
Clay Brown type may appear to have the aura of tax avoidance
schemes lacking in economic substance. However, they are actually
sheep in wolves' clothing. The Commissioner used the off-beat trappings as the occasion for launching an attack which, if successful,
would have created an open season for sheep previously considered
secure in the capital-gain sanctuary. The Supreme Court detected
the true nature of the animal despite the Commissioner's loud cries
of "wolf."
In Clay Brown, the Supreme Court sustained the tax cornerstone
of bootstrap sales by holding that capital-gain treatment is not precluded merely because payment of the purchase price is wholly
dependent upon cash flow generated by the transferred property and
upon the property itself. Such capital-gain benefits are available
even though the seller manages the property during the pay-out
period. This holding is supported by economic substance attributable to the obligation of the seller to relinquish all interest in the
transferred property upon full payment of the purchase price.
Economic substance may be lacking when the purchase price is
so high as to make it obvious at the time of transfer that the parties
contemplate a default which will permit the seller to recapture the
assets. Similarly, the price may be so high as to make it clear at the
time of transfer that the assets will be completely exhausted in the
process of paying the purchase price. 61 If the purchase price is not
sufficiently high to vitiate the economic substance of a transaction,
60. Present indications are that the Commissioner will concentrate on the joint
undertaking or joint venture approach against the charitable institutions. This will
terminate his campaign against the operating companies. The Tax Court case involving
Fortuna Sawmills, Inc. (the operating company in Clay Brown) was on the February
Portland, Oregon calendar of the Tax Court. Pursuant to the request of counsel for
the Commissioner, the hearing was postponed until the Commissioner has made a
definite decision concerning his position.
61. See the discussion in note 22 supra dealing with the issue of whether this
lack of economic substance would actually negate capital-gain treatment.
·
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but it nevertheless exceeds a reasonable range, the door is left open
for the Commissioner to tax the excessive portion as ordinary income.
The Clay Brown decision was not a defeat for the Commissioner
which will open the floodgates of tax avoidance. It was merely a
judicial admonition to correlate his assertions with economic reality.
There simply is nothing wrong with a bootstrap sale where the
purchase price is reasonable and the seller is obligated to relinquish
all rights to the purchaser upon full payment of the purchase price.
Ordinary income is not converted into capital gain when a reasonable purchase price is payable from cash fl.ow generated by the
underlying corporate assets.
If the Supreme Court had adopted the Commissioner's contention of "no sale" unless there is a substantial down payment from
independent sources or meaningful personal liability, how large
should the down payment be and how much financial aflluence must
the purchaser possess to assure capital gain treatment for the seller?
The Commissioner made it clear in his Supreme Court brief that
these were questions of degree, requiring judgment based on all
the circumstances.62 Such an unsettled state of affairs would militate
agai11st any deferred-payment sale, since a seller would run a risk as
to whether the size of the down payment or financial affluence of
the purchaser fell within or beyond the shadowy boundary line.
Under the Commissioner's assertions, only the :financially affluent would be capable of assuring capital-gain benefits for a seller.
In the past, however, bootstrap purchases have been a primary
method for attaining financial aflluence. Considerable romance
would depart from the American economic scene if the "have nots"
could not compete with the "haves" for the purchase of businesses.
Whether tax exempt institutions should share in the romance is a
separate question, but the Commissioner did not restrict his attack
in Clay Brown to transactions involving tax exempt institutions.
He asked the Court to sound the death knell for all bootstrap sales.
The Supreme Court rejected the Commissioner's swe<;!ping assertions, and it is hoped that Congress will exercise the same discretion,
regardless of what may be done in regard to bootstrap participation
of charitable institutions or loss corporations.
62. "It hardly needs adding that whether any given down payment or pledge of
other assets or of personal liability is sufficient to qualify a particular transaction
as a sale is, of course, a question of degree, requiring a judgment based upon all the
circumstances bearing on the extent to which there has been a significant shift of
the risks. The judgment would have to take into account, for example, not only the
absolute amount of the down payment or its relationship to the price but also such
factors as the speculative or stable nature of the asset • • • ." Brief for Appellant,
p. 58, Commissioner v. Clay Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965).

